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ABSTRACT 
The literature has identified three main approaches to account for the way exchange rate regimes 
are chosen: i) the optimal currency area theory; ii) the financial view, which highlights the 
consequences of international financial integration; and iii) the political view, which stresses the use 
of exchange rate anchors as credibility enhancers in politically challenged economies. Using de facto 
and de jure regime classifications, we test the empirical relevance of these approaches separately 
and jointly. We find overall empirical support for all of them, although the incidence of financial 
and political aspects varies substantially between industrial and non-industrial economies. 
Furthermore, we find that the link between de facto regimes and their underlying fundamentals has 
been surprisingly stable over the years, suggesting that the global trends often highlighted in the 
literature can be traced back to the evolution of their natural determinants, and that actual policies 
have been little influenced by the frequent twist and turns in the exchange rate regime debate. 
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I. Introduction
Much of the recent policy discussion on exchange rate regimes has focused mostly on the 
trends  in  regime  choice  as  if  this  were  largely  independent  from  country-specific 
characteristics.1 Following this interpretation, it is argued that after the early experiments 
with floats prompted by the collapse of Bretton Woods, we witnessed a regained popularity 
of pegs in the 80s and early 90s,  to a large degree owing to their presumed beneficial 
effects on taming inflation. However, the stream of currency crises that started with the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 have cast doubt on their sustainability, and the 
ephemeral enthusiasm with “hard” pegs (particularly, currency boards) advocated by the 
bipolar view was further debunked by the Argentine debacle. As a result, in recent years 
there has been a growing consensus in favor of flexible arrangements.
Yet such temporary fads, and the “one-size-fits-all” view of exchange rate arrangements 
that  underlies  them, seem at  odds with both the casual  evidence and the conventional 
wisdom that indicate that the regime choice is itself endogenous to the local and global 
economic contexts. This endogeneity of exchange rate regimes has not gone unnoticed in 
the economic literature. On the contrary, over the last forty years a large body of analytical 
work has provided key insights on the potential determinants of the regime choice.
This paper tests whether, and to what extent, the alternative approaches identified by the 
literature help explain the choice of exchange rate regimes, and how the drivers underlying 
the choice of regime have changed over time. 
Our  results  are  quite  revealing.  We  find  that,  once  all  contending  hypotheses  are 
considered jointly, the choice of exchange rate regimes can indeed be traced back to a few 
1 An exception is Frankel (1999).
simple determinants that include a combination of trade, financial and political variables. 
Moreover, we find that the way countries choose their exchange rate regime in response to 
these  basic  determinants  has  not  changed  substantially  over  the  last  two  decades, 
suggesting that,  for good or bad,  the key normative insights provided by the academic 
literature  have influenced  actual  exchange rate policy beyond the occasional twists and 
turns that characterized the exchange rate debate.
To our knowledge, most of the empirical exploration of the determinants of the choice of 
regimes  has  been partial,  focusing on  a  particular  hypothesis  without  approaching  the 
subject in a comprehensive model that encompasses all available candidate explanations 
–a  concern  given  the  frequently  high  correlation  between  the  associated  variables. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), for example, center on the implications of the optimal 
currency area theory, Eichengreen et al (2002) on “original sin”, and Stein and Frieden 
(2001) on political economy variables. The few attempts to tackle the issue from a broader 
perspective  (for  example,  Edwards,  1996;  Rizzo,  1998;  and  Juhn  and  Mauro,  2002) 
rendered disappointing results.2 Closest to ours are Alesina and Wagner (2006) and Von 
Hagen and Zhou (2009). Alesina and Wagner (2006) estimate a similar, though somewhat 
simplified version, of what we do here and then focus on the decision to renege on the 
announced regime (as captured by the difference between de jure and de facto regimes). 
Von Hagen and Zhou (2009) estimate a simultaneous equations model and suggest that 
the choice of de facto regimes depends on the choice of de jure regimes but not vice versa.3 
2 See also Poirson (2001), and Collins (1996), for a sample of Latin American countries. The significant exception to 
these disappointing results has been the literature on the trade effect of currency unions started by Rose (2000). 
While not framed in terms of the choice of exchange rate regime, the estimated effects were so large that they would 
certainly have an impact on the choice of regime. See also Frankel and Rose (1997, 2002) and Frankel (2005) for a 
survey.
3 See Von Hagen and Zhou (2007) for an additional description of the empirical literature and an analysis along the 
lines of the one we perform in this paper.
In this light, the main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it assesses the empirical 
support  of  alternative  explanations  based  on  an  updated  dataset;  using  by  now  the 
standard distinction between de jure and de facto classifications of exchange rate regimes 
(see Tavlas et al 2008 for a review of this literature. The difficulty in identifying exchange 
rate  regimes  has  also  been  underscored  in  Frankel  et  al  2000).  Second,  and  more 
important,  it  nests  the  main  theoretical  views  on  the  determinants  of  exchange  rate 
regimes in a common framework that allows us to test them jointly, unveiling the relative 
relevance of  each one of  them. These  two contributions  provide the basis  for  what  we 
believe is a comprehensive test of forty years of literature on exchange rate regimes.
More precisely,  we simultaneously  test  what  we believe  are  the  three  main competing 
approaches to explaining the choice of exchange rate regimes: i) the optimal currency area 
(OCA)  theory  pioneered  by  Mundell  (1961),  which  relates  the  choice  of  regime  to  the 
country’s trade links, size, openness and the characteristics of the shocks the economy is 
subject  to;4 ii)  the  financial  view,  which  highlights  the  consequences  of  international 
financial integration;5 and iii) and the political view, which regards the use of a peg (or, 
more generally,  an exchange rate anchor) as  a “policy  crutch” for  governments  lacking 
(nominal and institutional) credibility.67
Our overall results using de facto regimes provide strong support for each of these views, 
although some of them apply differently for industrial and non-industrial economies. In 
4 While this tradeoff is often associated with the traditional Mundell-Fleming framework, the view of exchange rates 
as real shock absorbers dates back to the work of Meade (1950).
5 This approach comprises the impossible trinity argument that stresses the role of increased capital mobility as a 
factor limiting the effectiveness of pegs (see, i.e., Rose, 1994; Fischer, 2001; and Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002), and the 
currency mismatch argument that claims that exchange rate variability in financially dollarized emerging economies 
is contained due to their deleterious balance sheet effects (see, i.a., Calvo and Reinhart , 2002, and Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 1999).
6  See Drazen (2000) and references there.
7 Of course there may be other reasons for the choice of exchange rate regimes that we have left out of the analysis. 
One that comes to mind is the objective of fixing to ensure competitiveness and avoid overvaluations (see Aizenman 
and Lee, 2005 and Prasad et al, 2006). Because the universe would be potentially too large in this paper we have 
focused on the main hypotheses.
particular, we find that the implications of OCA theory carry through in both groups of 
countries. By contrast, whereas financial integration tends to foster flexible regimes among 
industrialized  countries  –in  line  with  the  impossible  trinity  view–,  it  increases  the 
propensity to peg among non-industrial countries –something that we attribute to the fact 
that  integration  in  those  countries  is  strongly  correlated  with  foreign  currency-
denominated  external  liabilities  and  larger  currency  mismatches,  as  documented  by 
Eichengreen et al (2003). We also find support for the political view, albeit in a qualified 
version: pegs are more likely if the country lacks a good institutional track record, but less 
likely if the government is too weak to sustain them. Specifically, we find the choice of a 
peg to  be  negatively  correlated  with  institutional  quality  –a result  consistent with  the 
policy  crutch  view–,  but  positively  correlated  with  political  strength  –hinting  at  a 
sustainability problem. Indeed, we find that, although non-peg countries are more likely to 
adopt de jure (but not a de facto) peg in an inflationary context, most of these inflation-
induced de jure pegs are ultimately short lived, a result that is consistent with recent work 
by Klein and Schambaugh (2006). 
Finally, by recovering the time dummies estimated in our baseline specification, we can 
study whether the evolution of regimes over the last decades displays any particular time 
pattern beyond and above that spanned by our set of basic controls. The estimation based 
on the IMF’s de jure classification reveals a clear trend throughout the 80s and 90s: a 
strong “peg bias” in the early years that narrows steadily to virtually disappear by the end 
of the period. However, when we repeat the exercise based on de facto regimes, we find no 
discernible  time  pattern.  From  these  findings,  we  conclude:  i)  that  the  trends  often 
highlighted in the recent exchange rate regime debate, visible in the evolution of de jure 
regimes,  are not  reflected in de facto exchange rate policies,  and ii)  that actual  regime 
choices  can  be  traced  back  to  the  evolution  of  regime  determinants  rather  than  to  a 
changing view of the relative merits of different arrangements: if anything, the debate can 
be credited for the increasing reluctance to adopt explicit exchange rate commitments at 
odds with underlying fundamentals.
II. The Theories of Exchange Rate Regimes Determination
Our exploration of the determinants of exchange rate regimes is centered on three main 
approaches that have long been part of the open economy macroeconomics toolkit:  the 
theory of optimal currency areas (OCA), the financial integration approach (specifically, 
the incidence of the impossible trinity and balance sheet effects), and the political economy 
view of pegs as credibility enhancers.
In each case, a key aspect of the exercise consists in finding variables that capture, as close 
as possible, the factors highlighted by the theory. Since the choice of particular variables is 
bound to be controversial, we first evaluate a number of alternative controls for each of the 
three  approaches  separately.  To  do  so,  we  run  multinomial  logit  regressions  for  an 
unbalanced panel  data set of  183 countries  over the post-Bretton Woods period (1974- 
2004) on each set of controls.8 We then run a parsimonious specification that includes all 
controls  selected  in  the  partial  tests,  to  assess  the  relative  importance  of  each  set  of 
explanations.
As noted, an important novelty of this paper lies in its focus on de facto exchange rate 
regimes. More precisely, our empirical exercises use as dependent variable a categorical 
variable that takes three values: 1 for floats, 2 for intermediates and 3 for pegs, according 
8 Appendix 1 lists the countries in our sample, grouped into the industrial and non-industrial categories. 
to the de facto regime classification assembled by Levy Yeyati  and Sturzenegger (2003, 
2005).9
OCA theory
The first group of factors potentially underpinning the choice of regime is related to the 
geographical  and trade aspects identified by the theory of optimal currency areas.  This 
approach to the fix vs. float dilemma weighs the trade and welfare gains from a stable 
exchange rate vis à vis the rest of the world (or, more precisely, the country’s main trade 
partners)  against  the  benefits  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  as  a  shock  adjuster  in  the 
presence of nominal rigidities.
According  to  this  argument,  country  characteristics  that  favor  a  more stable  (or  fixed) 
exchange rate are openness (which enhances the trade gains derived from stable bilateral 
exchange rates),10 smallness (indirectly through the higher propensity of small economies 
to trade internationally, and directly by limiting the scope for the use of a national unit of 
account),  and  the  concentration  of  the  country’s  trade  with  the  peg  currency  country 
(which, again, increases the gains from reducing the bilateral exchange rate volatility).11
Regarding  the  incidence  of  real  shocks,  the  traditional  Mundell-Flemming  framework 
argues that, in order to minimize output fluctuations, fixed (flexible) exchange rates are to 
be preferred if nominal (real) shocks are the main source of disturbance in the economy.12 
9 The robustness of the results to the standard IMF-based de jure classification, as well as Reinhart and Rogoff´s 
(2004) alternative de facto classification is addressed below.
10 An alternative explanation relies on Cavallo and Frankel (2004) who show that open economies are less prone to a 
sudden stop, thus reducing the benefits of flexibility.
11 In the case of pegs to a basket of currencies, the reference currency is the main currency in the basket peg. For 
intermediate and floating regimes, the reference currency is assumed to be the one that exhibits the least volatility 
relative to the local currency among major international currencies and currencies of the main regional partners. See 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) for details.
12 Classic references on this are Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963).
For  example,  high  volatility  of  terms  of  trade  would  provide  a  rationale  for  a  float. 
Moreover, to the extent that real shocks become increasingly important due to growing 
trade flows and capital market integration (alternatively, as monetary shocks or inflation 
concerns become less of a priority) one should expect to see a global trend towards more 
flexible arrangements.13
In  order  to  test  the  optimal  currency  area  hypothesis  we  use  measures  of  size  (the 
logarithm  of  the  country’s  GDP in  US  dollars,  Size),  openness  (the  GDP share  of  the 
average  of  exports  plus  imports,  Openness),14 geographical  concentration  of  trade  (the 
share of exports to the reference currency country multiplied by openness,  TradeConc), 
and, to capture the incidence of real  shocks, terms of trade volatility  (computed as the 
standard deviation of terms of trade changes over the previous five years weighted by the 
degree of openness, TOTShocks).15 We use lagged values (indicated by placing a 1 after the 
variable) where we believe endogeneity may be a concern.16 All regressions in the paper 
include year dummies.
Table 1 reports the results from our partial test of the OCA approach, for the whole sample 
as well as for the industrial and non-industrial subsamples. The expected sign is shown in 
the first column. As can be seen, the theory is strongly supported by the data.  For the 
whole  sample  (columns  i  and  ii),  all  coefficients  show the  correct  sign and are  highly 
13 Eichengreen  et  al  (2002),  Lane  (1995),  and Frieden et  al  (2000) provide empirical  evidence suggesting  that, 
contrary to the nominal-real story, terms of trade variability is positively related with the probability that a country 
selects a peg. Eichengreen et al (2002) propose the following explanation: “fixed exchange rate regimes should result 
in deeper financial markets, which should be particularly important in economies facing important terms of trade 
shocks”.  However,  two  recent  papers  by  Broda  (2004)  and  Edwards  and  Levy-Yeyati  (2005)  using  de  facto 
classifications of exchange rate regimes provide empirical evidence that pegs indeed exhibit larger output sensitivity 
to real shocks.
14 The use of Frankel and Romer's (1999) measure of openness (“actual trade share”, defined as the ratio of imports 
plus exports to GDP (Penn World Table, Mark 5.6, Series OPEN).) to mitigate endogeneity problems yields similar 
results at the cost of fewer observations. We come back to the issue of endogeneity below.
15An alternative would have been to use the trade with the whole block of countries pegged to the reference country as 
in Klein and Shambaugh (2004) and Meissner and Oomes (2006). 
16 Appendix 2 presents a list of variables and sources, as well as a table with summary descriptive statistics.
significant. However, there is a difference between industrial and non-industrial countries 
in the effect of real shocks (TOTShocks). For non-industrial countries (columns iii and iv), 
this effect is less strong and it seems to decrease the probability of choosing a peg and 
there is  no significant effect  in the probability  of  choosing a  float.  On the other  hand, 
industrial countries (columns v and vi), are more likely to choose a flexible regime when 
real shocks become more important. The OCA approach appears as a stronger determinant 
in the case of industrial economies than in the non-industrial ones. This is evident from the 
individual coefficients as well as from the higher R-squared.
The financial view 
A key ingredient of the textbook Mundell-Fleming framework is the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility that implies international interest rate arbitrage across countries in the 
form of  the  uncovered  interest  parity.  From  this  framework,  it  follows  that  monetary 
policies in open economies cannot be aimed both at maintaining stable exchange rates and 
smoothing out cyclical output fluctuations due to real shocks. This is usually referred to as 
the “impossible trinity,” namely, the fact that policymakers can choose at most two out the 
three vertexes of the trinity (capital mobility, monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate).
Obstfeld  and  Taylor  (2002)  link  the  evolution  of  exchange  rate  arrangements  to  the 
historical phases of financial globalization, based on this “impossible trinity” argument.
They argue  that,  while  capital  mobility  prevailed  at  a  time when monetary  policy  was 
subordinated  to exchange rate  stability  (as  in the gold standard),  as  soon as  countries 
attempted to  use  monetary  policy  to  revive  their  economies  during WWI,  they  had  to 
impose  controls  to  curtail  capital  movements.17 Inverting  their  argument,  it  has  been 
17 On the same point, see Bordo and Flandreau (2001). Note that the trinity argument suggests the joint endogeneity of 
exchange rate and capital account regime choices, to which we come back below.
argued  that,  as  financial  globalization  deepened  in  the  last  decades,  monetary  policy 
became increasingly at odds with fixed exchange rates. This argument underscores the so-
called  “bipolar  view”  of  exchange  rate  regimes,  according  to  which  increased  capital 
mobility  has made intermediate regimes less viable in (financially  open) industrial  and 
emerging economies.18 In addition, a rapid process of financial deepening and innovation 
(which typically has advanced pari passu with financial integration in international capital 
markets)  has  gradually  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  capital  controls,  with  the  same 
consequences in terms of the monetary policy-exchange rate stability dilemma.
Recent  literature  has  stressed  that  currency  mismatches  in  financially  dollarized 
economies  may  also  be  critical  to  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regimes.  In  particular, 
countries with important (private or public) foreign liabilities may be more prone to fix 
(either de jure or de facto) due to the deleterious impact of sharp nominal depreciation of 
the currency on the solvency of balance sheets with currency mismatches.19 Notice that this 
channel, if present, may undo the positive relationship between capital account openness 
and flexible  regimes  suggested  by  the  impossible  trinity  argument.  To  the  extent  that 
financial openness induces large swings in capital flows that in turn lead to large changes 
in  the  value  of  the  exchange  rate,  financially  dollarized  countries  may  find  it  more 
convenient to fix rather than float merely for prudential reasons, a phenomenon that has 
been  dubbed  “fear  of  floating”  by  Calvo  and  Reinhart  (2002).  As  the  authors  argue, 
“defaults and general debt servicing difficulties mount if the exchange rate is allowed to 
slide,”  which  “may  help  explain  why,  at  least  historically,  there  has  been  a  marked 
18 See, e.g., Fischer (2001). The point had been raised earlier by Quirk (1994) and Eichengreen (1994), among others.
19 See, e.g., Eichengreen and Hausmann (2003). It has to be noted that, while the real exchange rate adjustment in the 
event  of  a  negative  external  shock cannot  be avoided by sustaining  a  peg,  the  downward rigidity  of  prices  may 
postpone the process over time, preventing a financial collapse. In addition, a nominal adjustment of the exchange 
rate  is  usually  accompanied  by  an  exchange  rate  overshooting  that  can  only  reinforce  the  negative  financial 
implications.
tendency  in  most  countries  to  confine  exchange  rate  movements  to  relatively  narrow 
bands...”
Thus, disentangling empirically these two countervailing aspects –impossible trinity and 
currency mismatches– is particularly challenging in the case of non-industrial economies, 
many of  which tend to exhibit  important levels  of  financial  dollarization.  Moreover,  in 
most  cases,  financial  integration  is  likely  to be correlated  with larger  stocks of  foreign 
liabilities  denominated  in  a  foreign  currency,  rendering  balance  sheet  considerations 
relatively more pressing. In this regard, it is important to note that, as holders of foreign 
assets and liabilities differ (at least from a legal point of view), a sudden devaluation is 
likely  to hurt dollar  debtors irrespective of the amount of  foreign assets owned by the 
country's residents; hence, our focus on gross (as opposed to net) foreign liabilities as a 
measure of the currency mismatch.20 
With  this  in  mind,  we  examine  the  following  five  alternative  variables  to  capture  the 
influence of financial linkages on the choice of regime:
i) Chinn  and  Ito´s  (2007)  measure  of  de  jure  capital  account  openness 
(KAOpen). The measure, available for 105 countries since 1977, is based on 
four  binary  dummy  variables  reported  in  the  IMF´s  Annual  Report  on 
Exchange Rates and Exchange Restrictions with a higher number indicating 
a lower overall level of restrictions.21
ii) The  sum  of  the  absolute  value  of  inward  and  outward  flows  of  portfolio 
investments  and  financial  derivatives  (sourced  from  the  International 
20 See Levy Yeyati (2004) for a discussion along these lines.
21 Kaminsky  and  Schmukler’s  (2001)  capital  controls  index,  an  alternative  candidate,  failed  to  be  significantly 
correlated with the regime choice, possibly due to the fact that it covers only 28 countries.
Financial  Statistics)  as  a  share  of  GDP (Portfolio),  a  measure  of  de facto 
capital account openness.22
iii) A financial  development  dummy (FinDev),  equal  to one when the country 
belongs to  the industrial  group or when it  is  included  in  the JP Morgan’s 
EMBI Global index.23
iv) The  country’s  gross  stock  of  foreign  assets  over  GDP  (CumLoans),  an 
alternative  measure  of  de  facto  capital  account  openness,  where  the  asset 
stock  (computed  by  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferreti,  2001)  is  measured  as  the 
cumulative  flows  of  portfolio  debt  assets,  other  assets  and  net  errors  and 
omissions.
v) The  ratio  of  foreign  liabilities  in  the  domestic  financial  sector  relative  to 
money  stocks  (FLM),  a  measure  of  liability  dollarization  to  proxy  for  the 
presence of currency mismatches.24
Table 2 shows the correlations between these different measures of financial linkages. The 
first  four  are  all  strongly  (positively)  correlated,  and  virtually  uncorrelated  with  our 
measure of liability dollarization, with the exception of the stock of foreign assets. As the 
latter  is  available  only  for  a limited set  of  countries  and periods,  we drop it  from our 
empirical tests below.25 Since FinDev may be correlated with the size of the economy for 
22 This is a modified version of Juhn and Mauro’s (2002) portfolio openness measure, computed as the sum of the 
absolute value of the change in financial assets and liabilities, which includes (longer term) FDI and (presumably 
countercyclical) official flows. The latter are arguably less relevant to the hypotheses that we want to test and are 
therefore excluded from our measure. The distinction between de jure and de facto capital account openness (more 
precisely, between restrictions on capital flows and realized capital flows) is highlighted by Prassad et al (2003).
23 The use of the EMBI index as an indicator of financial development, also borrowed from Juhn and Mauro (2002), 
is motivated by the fact that non-industrial countries make it to the EMBI Global portfolio if their (typically external) 
sovereign  bond  issues  have  sufficient  liquidity  (JPMorgan,  1999).  Furthermore,  EMBI  indexing  tends  to  fuel 
international  investors  interest  and,  through this  channel,  helps  strengthening  the  country’s  financial  links  with 
international markets.
24 Alternative  candidates such as Eichengreen et al's  (2002)  “ability to  pay” measures and Levy Yeyati’s  (2004) 
deposit dollarization ratios are available only for a limited number of countries or for recent years.
25  Its inclusion yields results that are comparable with those for the other capital account openness controls, at the  
expense of an important reduction in the size of the sample.
the non-industrial sample due to the minimum trading volume required to be in the EMBI 
index, we include size as an additional control in the regressions to partial out this effect.
Table 3 shows the results of our partial  test of the financial  linkages approach, for the 
whole sample as well as for the industrial and non-industrial subsamples. As before, we 
estimate a multinomial logit, where the dependent variable is a categorical variable that 
reflects the de facto three-way classification of exchange rate regimes. According to the 
currency  mismatch  hypothesis,  we  should  expect  higher  liability  dollarization  to  be 
positively  associated  with  the  propensity  to  peg,  something  that  bears  out  in  the  two 
groups as identified by negative and significant coefficients of the foreign liability variable 
(FLM). The financial integration variables, on the other hand, exhibit different results for 
each of the two groups of countries. For the non-industrial sample (columns iii and iv), the 
coefficients  are  negative  and significant,  suggesting that  the  implications  of  impossible 
trinity should be qualified by the presence of currency mismatches that appear to prevail in 
the choice of exchange rate policy. By contrast, for (non-financially dollarized) industrial 
economies with  smaller  currency mismatches (columns v and vi),  the regime choice  is 
more  consistent  with  the  impossible  trinity  argument,  as  indicated  by  the  positive 
correlation between capital  openness and the probability  of  choosing a flexible regime. 
Notice  that  these  results  are  also  consistent  with  Aghion  et  al  (2006),  who show that 
exchange rate volatility enhances growth for financially developed economies. While we 
have not  divided  our  sample  on the  basis  of  financial  development,  to  the  extent  that 
developed  economies  are  more  developed  financially,  the  fact  that  capital  account 
openness leads to floating regimes for developed economies but not so for less developed 
economies may be signaling the different impact of exchange rate volatility for the two 
groups.
The political economy view
A large strand of literature has studied the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to 
reduce inflation. In particular, it has been argued that governments with a preference for 
low inflation  but  handicapped by low institutional  credibility,  facing the  uphill  task  of 
convincing the public  of  their  commitment to nominal  stability,  may adopt  a  peg as  a 
“policy  crutch”  to  tame inflationary  expectations.  It  follows  that  countries  with  a  poor 
institutional track record may be more prone to rely on fixed exchange rate arrangements 
as  a  second  best  solution  to  a  commitment  problem.  As  the  argument  goes,  weak 
governments that are more vulnerable to “expansionary pressures” or “fiscal voracity” (i.e., 
pressures from interest groups with the power to extract fiscal transfers) may choose to use 
a peg as a way of fending off these pressures.26
To be sure, the literature does not provide an unambiguous answer regarding the sign of 
the link between political strength and exchange rate regimes. Indeed, the policy crutch 
effect can be easily reversed: weak governments could be associated with larger deficits (or 
lower ability to reduce them, if needed) that makes the peg more difficult to sustain. This is 
particularly true in the presence of wars or social unrest, but could be extended to episodes 
of  political  turmoil  or  even  to  tranquil  times  to  the  extent  that  anemic  governments 
become more vulnerable to the political pressure from interest groups. More in general, a 
“sustainability hypothesis” that links weak governments with either the collapse of existing 
pegs or the inability to launch a credible one would entail a positive correlation between 
political strength and pegs, rather than the other way around as the policy crutch argument 
would imply. 
26 See Fratianni and Von Hagen (1990) and Drazen (2000), for an extensive review, including a careful discussion of 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) where the idea was first developed. On the fiscal voracity effect, see Tornell and Lane 
(1999).
Testing these views, in turn, is challenging due to the difficulty of capturing in a single, or 
even a few observable variables  the concepts of credibility  and sustainability.  Thus,  we 
adopt a fairly candid view to examine a diverse set of variables used in the economic and 
political science literature to reflect political and institutional characteristics, and to assess 
whether  they  could  be  interpreted  as  indicators  of  political  strength.  The  first  three 
variables, taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (2006), include 
the number of years that the incumbent administration has been in office (YearsinOffice), 
a  Herfindahl  index  of  congressional  politics  (Herfindahl),  and  a  legislative  index  of 
electoral competitiveness (LegComp). 
Since our data covers all countries in the world, long tenures may indicate both relatively 
successful governments, as well as long-lasting (possibly totalitarian) regimes with a high 
degree  of  control  of  the local  political  process.  If  so,  years  in office  would represent a 
measure of government strength, possibly subject to a diminishing effect as the clout of 
longer governments eventually wears out. The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of 
the squared seat-shares of all parties in the government. As discussed early on by Olson 
(1982,  1993)  the  atomization  of  political  players  is  associated  with  the  deepening  of 
common  pool  problems,  leading  to  greater  incentives  to  extract  from  the  common 
resources and mounting fiscal pressure. Thus, a larger value of the Herfindahl index would 
be  associated  with  political  strength.  Finally,  the  legislative  index  of  electoral 
competitiveness increases as the legislatures become more competitive. Ranging from a 
value of 1, when there is no legislature, to a value of 7 when the largest party in congress 
holds less than 75% of the seats, this index would be correlated with political weakness.
We also test a fourth political variable, namely, the number of veto points in the political 
system (VetoPoints)  as  reported  in  Henisz's  Polcon  Database  (2005),  which  measures 
directly the difficulties or steps required by a government to push its agenda. Accordingly, 
we expect it to represent a measure of government weakness.
Finally,  we  examine  two  alternative  institutional  quality  indicators.  First,  we  use  the 
operations risk index (OperationsRisk), a survey that gauges the domestic environment for 
the operation of foreign businesses assembled for 53 countries by Business Environment 
Risk Intelligence S.A,  where a higher value indicates a better environment.  Second, we 
evaluate the  World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Rating System  
(CPIA). These ratings are based on the assessment of each country’s governance as well as 
its economic, structural, social, and public reform policies prepared by the World Bank’s 
country economists; again, a higher value would indicate higher institutional quality.27 In 
both cases, we would expect to observe a negative link between the quality of institutions 
and the propensity to peg. 
The correlations matrix reported in Table 4 confirms our priors concerning the political 
variables:  measures  of  political  strength  (Herfindahl  and  years  in  office)  and  political 
weakness (veto points and legislative competitiveness) are positively correlated with each 
other, and negatively correlated with the other group. In addition,  the two institutional 
variables (operation risk and the CPIA) are also strongly correlated with each other, as 
expected.
This allows us to build a parsimonious specification that avoids excessive multicollinearity 
for the partial tests of the political approach. More precisely, we select three variables that 
27 These ratings, prepared for a broad set of developing economies, cover the longer period (1977-1999) required by 
our empirical  tests, unlike other governance indicators assembled by The World Bank that are available only since 
the mid-90s.
capture, political strength (YearsinOffice, which is also included squared to test for the 
potential diminishing effect of long tenures noted above), political weakness (VetoPoints), 
and institutional quality (CPIA, available for the non-industrial sample).28 For the latter, 
the absence of an institutional control for the industrial sample should not be a concern to 
the extent that it is  reasonable to assume that the differential  influence of institutional 
quality  on  the  choice  of  regime  among  developed  countries,  with  comparably  high 
standards, should be, at best, very minor.
As the regression results show (Table 5), the probability of choosing a peg is negatively 
correlated with the quality of institutions, as the policy crutch view would indicate. The 
table  also  shows  that  pegs  are  positively related  to  political  strength,  in  line  with  the 
sustainability hypothesis: weak governments appear to be less prone to implement (and 
sustain) pegs, although the result appears to be not very strong for developed economies. 
How can we reconcile this second finding with the long-dated debate about the use of pegs 
as nominal anchors in inflationary economies –and the many historical experiences in this 
direction? To address this issue, it is useful to focus more narrowly on the incidence of 
inflation on the decision to move to a peg from a non-peg regime. Following Vegh (1992), 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) and Frieden et al (2000), it could be argued that countries with 
moderate  to  high  inflation  have  incentives  to  use  the  exchange  rate  as  an  anchor.29 
However, persistent high inflation also creates pressures on the exchange rate market that 
may  force  monetary  authorities  to  float  (either  voluntarily  or  as  a  consequence  of  a 
currency crisis).  Thus, the correlation between inflation and exchange rate rigidity may 
28 We drop Herfindahl due to relatively fewer observations, Operations Risk because of its very limited coverage, and 
Leg.Comp because, as opposed to VetoPoints, it has the same value for all industrial countries in our sample. The 
inclusion of the whole set of variables yields comparable results at the cost of severely limiting sample size.
29 There is empirical evidence that (long-lasting) pegs have been successful at reducing inflation. See, among others, 
Ghosh et al (1997) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001).
reflect  both credibility  and sustainability  aspects.  To disentangle  these two effects,  and 
bearing in mind that most exchange rate-based stabilizations in the past were preceded by 
hyperinflation  bursts,  it  is  useful  to  differentiate  moderate  from  high  inflation  (and 
hyperinflation) episodes known to elicit rapid policy reactions. 
To that end, in Table 5b, we restrict our sample to countries that in the preceding period 
are not classified as pegs, and test the effect associated with a dummy for high inflation 
(High250) that is equal to one whenever the inflation rate in the previous year exceeds 
250%,  which  we  believe  reflects  more  accurately  the  need  for  a  quick  credibility 
enhancement. Using a de facto classification, the results indicate that the probability of 
adopting a peg is not significantly higher in countries coming from high inflation (column 
iv). 
One could argue, however, that the use of an exchange rate anchor is intimately related to 
an explicit commitment to a peg. If so, we would expect inflation-challenged governments 
to peg de jure (rather than de facto). This is indeed what the evidence seems to indicate. 
When  we  use  the  de  jure  regime  classification,  the  high  inflation  dummy  becomes 
significant and with the expected positive sign: high inflation tends to induce the de jure 
adoption of an exchange rate anchor.30
These results can be illustrated by a cursory look at the data. Out of the 37 non-peg high 
inflation country year observations included in the regression, 16 moved to a de jure peg 
the  following  year.31 But  of  these,  only  3  qualify  as  de  facto  pegs.  This  suggests  that, 
30 The choice of 250% is not arbitrary. Lower levels did not deliver significant results, indicating that the credibility 
effect at lower inflation rates is not sufficient to induce the choice of a peg.
31 Note  that  this  amounts  to  43% of  the  high  inflation  observations,  significantly  above  the  25% probability  of 
switching from non-peg to peg for the whole sample.
whereas  weak  governments  tend  to  implement  explicit  (de  jure)  exchange  rate 
commitments as a policy crutch against inflation, these attempts tend to be short-lived as
the peg becomes ultimately unsustainable.
Thus, our preliminary findings provide a nuanced support for the policy crutch approach. 
On the one hand,  institutional  quality  is  inversely  related  to the  propensity  to  peg,  as 
countries rely on an exchange rate anchor to compensate for low institutional credibility. 
On the other, the fact that weak governments are likely to exhibit more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements points at sustainability as the main driving aspect.  Again, this does not 
contradict  the  view  of  pegs  as  policy  crutches:  it  provides  evidence  that  hard-pressed 
governments are prone to resort to a jure peg as a deflationary device, despite the fact that 
they are later on unable to sustain it.
III. Putting it all together
The previous section showed that the factors identified by the literature, taken separately, 
exhibit significant links to the choice of exchange rate regimes. We are ready to tackle the 
main objective of the paper, namely, to test the alternative hypotheses simultaneously in a 
framework that allows us to assess their relative importance –a crucial step given the fact 
that the three groups of controls are likely to be correlated with each other, potentially 
biasing the result of our partial tests.32 
32 The joint test also addresses the problem that many of the variables will be related among them. For example, 
political instability may be correlated with financial dollarization, and so on. By estimating all variables jointly we test 
for the effect of the orthogonal component relative to the other regressors for each variable, thus providing a more 
convincing setup to interpret the effect of each variable as corresponding to its autonomous effect on the dependent 
variable.
To ensure consistency and comparability of the results, we put the three approaches to test 
by  pooling  the  selected  controls  in  a  baseline  specification  and  testing  them jointly.33 
However,  since our  primary interest  is  to examine the  relevance of  different  analytical 
approaches  to  the  regime  choice  problem  rather  than  the  significance  of  individual 
variables we also report joint significance tests for each group of variables.
The results  of  our baseline regression,  shown in Table 6,  are in line with our previous 
findings. As can be seen, the estimated coefficients for the whole sample (columns i and ii) 
reflect closely those for the non-industrial group (columns iii and iv). The probability of 
choosing a peg is higher in small open economies with high levels of foreign liabilities and 
financial integration, poor institutional quality and strong governments. At the bottom of 
the table we report the Wald test of joint significance for all the coefficients corresponding 
to each approach –all of them strongly statistically significant.
Columns v and vi replicate  the baseline  for  industrial  countries.  OCA variables  remain 
strong predictors of exchange rate choice. However, capital account openness controls now 
show the opposite sign –like liability dollarization, which is significant only relative to the 
intermediate  category–  supporting  the  impossible  trinity  hypothesis.  Moreover,  the 
coefficients of political variables display a less clear pattern. These results are, again, in 
line  with  our  partial  tests,  suggesting that  exchange rate  policy  in industrial  countries, 
relatively  free  from  political  or  financial  constraints,  enjoys  a  higher  degree  of 
independence and respond essentially to standard economic factors. 
33 Due  to  its  more  limited  sample  coverage  and  its  strong  correlation  with  openness,  we  dropped  the  trade 
concentration variable from our baseline specification. Results for the complete specification are similar and available 
upon request.
Overall,  the  model  displays  good  levels  of  predictive  accuracy.  For  the  non-industrial 
sample, the baseline specification correctly identifies 72% of pegs and 77% of non-pegs, 
showing  significant  in-sample  predictive  power.  The  numbers  are  even  better  for  the 
industrial sample: 90% of pegs and 83% of floats are correctly identified.34 
For the non-industrial sample, the predictive power is also quite good out of sample. The 
predictions for 2004, based on the baseline estimated for the period 1974-2003, indicate 
that the model has a success of about 67%, correctly predicting 45 cases out of a total of 68. 
Interestingly, a similar exercise for industrial countries correctly predicts all the non-pegs. 
However, the prediction is only correct in 4 out of 13 de facto pegs. This result is due to the 
European  countries,  indicating  that  the  rationale  for  the  exchange  rate  constraints 
imposed by the convergence to the Euro may go beyond the natural determinants captured 
by the present model.
What  is  the  economic  relevance  of  these  results?  Figure  1  addresses  this  point  by 
computing  the  change  in  the  estimated  probability  of  choosing  a  peg  as  we  span  the 
support of each explanatory variable (while others are kept fixed at their mean values). To 
visualize the relative significance of each variable, we set the vertical axis to the [0,1] range 
for all variables. The exercise is conducted for non-industrial and industrial countries to 
highlight the differences between the two groups.
The results are illuminating. As can be inferred from the figure, size appears to be critical 
as a determinant  of  exchange regime: very small  (large)  countries  choose a peg (float) 
almost with probability one. Openness also plays a significant role. A developing economy 
34 These results correspond to a threshold of 50%, based on the fact that the percentage of pegs in our sample 
is slightly above 50%. Alternative rules still yield good (albeit more biased) accuracy levels. For example, 
using an estimated probability threshold of 60%, the model correctly identifies 59% of pegs and 86% of non-
pegs for the non-industrial sample, and 82% of pegs and 87% of floats for the industrial sample.
with a trade to GDP ratio equal to 1 is 30% more likely to choose a fixed regime than a fully 
closed economy. Trade openness is even more strongly associated with the propensity to 
peg in industrial economies, where a 50% trade to GDP ratio virtually implies a peg. The 
volatility  of  terms  of  trade,  important  for  industrials,  is  almost  negligible  for  non-
industrials.
The divergence of the impact of financial variables across the two groups of countries is 
clearly illustrated in the figure. Capital account openness has a negative influence on the 
propensity to peg for developed economies; as opposed to a positive effect for developing 
ones (although both effects are relatively minor).  In the case of the portfolio flows, the 
effect for the industrial sample presents the same sign but a different pattern than for non-
industrials. In particular, a developing economy with flows of about 10% of GDP has a 30% 
higher propensity to peg than one with no flows. Moreover, as the graph indicates, virtually 
no developing economy with flows of 20% of GDP or higher allows its currency to float. 
Finally, increasing the liability dollarization ratio from zero to twice the money base raises 
the preference for a peg among developing economies by roughly 10%, and reduces it by 
about 10% in developed ones.
Finally, regarding political variables, tenure in office appears to be more relevant among 
non-industrials (it increases the probability of choosing a peg throughout the initial twenty 
years), while the number of veto points has a sizable effect for industrials (close to a 60% 
variation over the whole range). 
Alternative regime classifications
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004; RR) build an alternative de facto classification based on the 
“verification”  of  the  de  jure  regime,  reclassifying  the  regimes  where  the  exchange rate 
behavior does not match what is expected from the stated policy. Compared with the LYS 
classification used here,  RR offers the advantage that  it  corrects for  multiple  exchange 
rates, a practice that, while common among developing countries until  the early 1970s, 
diminished steadily to less than 10 percent of cases during the post-Bretton Woods period. 
However,  it  is  silent  about  the  degree  of  exchange  rate  intervention,  an  aspect  that  is 
essential to characterize exchange rate policy, particularly when it comes to regime choice, 
to the extent that this choice is likely to depend critically on the policy constraints imposed 
by each regime.35
It is reassuring to see that our findings are broadly preserved when we rerun our baseline 
specification  using  RR (Table  7).  For  the  sake  of  comparison,  the  sample  used  in  the 
regressions  includes  only  those  observations  that  are  also  classified  under  the  LYS 
methodology (the first four columns reproduce the results using LYS).36 As can be seen, the 
results for non-industrial countries are comparable, providing strong support for the OCA, 
the currency mismatch and the sustainability hypotheses. The results are also similar for 
industrials  countries,  with  the  exception  of  financial  linkages  variables  that  appear  as 
stronger determinants of flexible regimes. 
While  we  have  been  mostly  concerned  with  the  determinants  of  actual  exchange  rate 
policies as reflected in de facto regimes, it is interesting to examine how the determinants 
identified above influence the choice of de jure arrangements. With this view, Table 7b 
35 For example, due to the presence of multiple exchange rates, RR classify as intermediates or floats about 250 
observations (or 7.5% of their database) for which the official exchange rate does not move, despite the fact that these 
cases display an average monthly exchange rate intervention of 4% of the monetary base, indicating that the objective 
of keeping the official rate constant was an effective policy constraint. 
36 Note that, while RR goes farther back in time than LYS, sample coverage is not an issue for the post-Bretton Woods 
period studied in this paper, for which the number of classified cases is virtually the same: 4220 under LYS and 4395 
under RR.
presents the baseline estimation using the IMF-based de jure classification.37 Once again, 
the results compare surprisingly well with those for the de facto classification. The results 
for  non-industrial  countries  provide  evidence  in  favor  of  OCA  and  for  the  currency 
mismatch hypotheses. However, it delivers contradictory results for the political variables. 
For industrial countries the de jure classification finds an effect of balance sheet exposure 
and provides support for the impossible trinity hypothesis.
In sum, our main findings are robust to the classification criteria, confirming the overall 
relevance of the OCA approach, the support for the impossible trinity view in the case of 
industrial  countries,  and  the  incidence  of  currency  mismatch  considerations  as  an 
incentive to peg in non-industrial countries. Additionally, our findings are consistent with 
the view that  countries  with  poor  institutional  quality  tend to  resort  to pegs  as  policy 
crutches, subject to the constraints imposed by their political ability to sustain them.
Robustness
While most of the key explanatory variables that we used can be reasonably assumed to be 
exogenous to the regime decision, not  all  are free from reverse causality  concerns.  For 
example, a peg, by reducing bilateral exchange rate volatility, may foster trade with other 
users of the peg currency and, in turn, may increase openness.38 Financial depth has also 
been associated to exchange rate regimes, as a fixed exchange rate reduces exchange rate 
volatility,  stimulating  capital  flows.39 Others  have  argued  that  a  peg,  by  creating  the 
perception of an implicit  exchange rate  guarantee,  fosters financial  dollarization.  In all 
37 The data on de jure regimes is taken from Ghosh et al (2003).  
38 This point is made forcefully in Frankel and Rose (1997). See, among others, Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and 
Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003).
39 Hausmann et al (2000). See also Von Hagen and Zhou (2008) for an analysis of the two-way causality between 
exchange rate regimes and financial openness and integration.
three cases, the reverse link, from regime choice to openness, portfolio flows and liability 
dollarization, has the same positive sign as the one discussed above; hence, the potential 
endogeneity cannot be easily dismissed.
While in previous tests we used lagged values to attenuate the potential endogeneity, here 
we approach the problem more directly. We replicate the baseline specification (columns i 
and  ii  of  Table  6)  using  initial  values  for  openness  and  liability  dollarization  (these 
variables are identified with an i at the end), as well as the average of portfolio flows over 
the previous five years (Portfolio5), all variables that, as noted, may be affected by reverse 
causality. The results are reported in Table 8: the coefficients on initial values all have the 
same sign as those obtained in Table 6, and in most cases are similar in size.
Correcting for endogeneity by replacing the variables with their initial  values may be a 
highly  imperfect  way  of  dealing  with  the  problem,  particularly  if  some variables  show 
country-specific  or  global  trends that  may alter  them significantly  over long periods of 
time, rendering the initial value relatively uninformative. This may be the case for financial 
variables such as liability dollarization and portfolio flows. To address this shortcoming, 
we resort to instrumental variable (IV) estimation for the portfolio flows and dollarization 
variables. Standard econometric packages do not carry a routine for IV estimation in logit 
models;  thus,  for  proper  computation  of  standard  errors  we  used  a  bootstrapping 
technique.  Specifically,  we replicate  the  equation  for  the  prediction  of  the  endogenous 
variables  1000  times  by  bootstrapping  the  errors.  We then  replaced  the  instrumented 
variables in the exchange rate regime equation, which gave us a set of 1000 coefficients for 
each variable from which consistent estimators of the standard errors could be obtained. 
We used these standard errors to test hypotheses in the original specification. 
As predictors of portfolio flows we use income per capita (strongly correlated with portfolio 
flows, with higher income countries showing much larger degrees of financial integration) 
and the overnight LIBOR, based on the evidence that lower rates in industrial countries 
tend  to  foster  capital  flows,  particularly  towards  developing  countries.40 For  liability 
dollarization, we use its first lag, as well as Kauffman et al.’s (2002) Rule of Law index 
(ROL, averaged for each country), under the assumption that higher contractual risk tends 
to  induce  more rigid  contracts  (of  which dollarization  is  one common example).41 The 
results, reported in columns (v) and (vi), confirm our previous findings. 
One  additional  source  of  concern  is  the  omission  of  relevant  variables  that  may  be 
correlated with (and spuriously captured by) the included regressors. The most general 
way to control for (country-specific, time-invariant) omitted variables is through the use of 
country fixed effects. Unfortunately, the introduction of fixed effects suffers in our case 
from an important drawback. By restricting information to within-country variability,  it 
limits the scope of the exercise as some of the hypotheses tested here (most notable, OCA) 
involve slow moving variables. With this caveat in mind, we report the estimates from a 
fixed effect estimation of the baseline specification. As can be seen, most results remain 
unchanged.
Global Trends and sensitivity analysis
Our empirical specification also allows us to test the presence of global trends in the choice 
of  exchange  rate  regimes  beyond  and  above  those  driven  by  the  evolution  of  their 
underlying determinants. These trends can be recovered from the coefficients of the year 
40 On this, see, for example Calvo et al. (1992).
41 De Nicoló et al. (2003) and Rajan (2004) provide empirical evidence along these lines. It has to be noted, however, 
that we implicitly assume ROL remains relatively stable over time, since the variable is available only since 1996.
dummies  in  any  of  the  previous  regressions.  The  value  of  these  dummies  can  be 
interpreted  as  the  impact  of  common global  trends  not  captured  by the  fundamentals 
included in the specification as well as a bias reflecting the preferences of policy makers as 
a result of the evolving economic debate (or, possibly, transitory fads).
Figure 2 shows the difference in the change in the probability of choosing a peg associated 
to  each year  dummy in  the  baseline  specification  evaluated  at  the  mean values  of  the 
remaining  controls.  In  short,  these  values  indicate  by  how  much  the  probability  of 
choosing a peg was affected by factors beyond those captured by our fundamentals. For 
comparison, we replicate the exercise using the de jure regime classification.
As  can  be  seen,  year  dummies  obtained  from  de  facto  regimes  do  not  display  any 
significant trend or systematic bias over the last twenty years (i.e. since the mid eighties).
On the other hand, de jure regimes display a strong pro-fix bias that decreases steadily 
throughout the period. Initially countries exhibited a probability of choosing a peg that was 
almost 50% higher than warranted by fundamentals. By the end of the period this bias had 
fallen  to  5%.  These  findings  may  be  a  reflection  of  the  Bretton  Woods  inheritance:  a 
prevalence of de jure pegs that were not justified by fundamentals –and, possibly because 
of this, plagued by frequent realignments or sudden collapses. 
If so, the results may be indicating that a welcome influence of the intellectual debate on 
exchange  rate  policies  (and  perhaps  the  only  one)  lies  in  the  increasing  reluctance  to 
embrace  explicit  exchange  rate  commitments  when  underlying  fundamentals  and 
sustainability  concerns  recommend  otherwise.  By  contrast,  it  appears  that  the  way  in 
which de facto regimes relate to underlying fundamentals has remained relatively stable 
despite the heated discussions and frequent changes of heart that have characterized the 
exchange rate debate. 
IV. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that the positive choice of exchange rate 
regimes can be traced back to a group of geographical, financial and political variables in 
line  with  the  existing  normative  theories  of  regime  determination  highlighted  by  the 
economic  literature.  While  the  relevance  of  these  theories  naturally  depends  on  the 
particular characteristics of individual countries, our tests reveal some general patterns. 
More precisely, we find that, while OCA considerations affect similarly industrial and non-
industrial  countries,  the  influence  of  financial  linkages  differs  across  the  two  groups: 
whereas the impossibly trinity view prevails for the former, currency mismatch concerns 
appear  to  dominate  in  the  case  of  the  latter.  Similarly,  institutional  quality  and 
sustainability aspects appear to play a substantive role only in the case of non-industrials 
economies. 
To  the  extent  that  the  underpinnings  of  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regimes  has  not 
changed in a visible way over the last two decades, one can also conclude that, far from the 
fireworks  of  the  occasional  academic  fads,  policy  makers  that  have  to  choose  actual 
exchange rate arrangements continue to balance the few simple tradeoffs suggested by the 
optimal currency area, the need to gain credibility and the effects of financial integration.
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Table 1. OCA Theory
FULL SAMPLE NON-IND. IND.
EXPECTED
 SIGN I ii iii iv v vi
Size1 + 0.448*** 0.242*** 0.604*** 0.452*** 0.650*** 0.395***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.040) (0.037) (0.146) (0.109)
Openness1 - -3.705*** -2.936*** -2.714*** -2.689*** -14.725*** -0.947
(0.353) (0.331) (0.355) (0.353) (2.094) (1.305)
TOTshocks + 3.699*** 3.727*** 1.736 2.268* 37.000*** -12.148
(1.262) (1.164) (1.333) (1.240) (10.204) (9.524)
Observations 2941 2351 590
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.162 0.327
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country  is classified as a de facto flexible 
exchange rate regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed.  Estimations  from a multinomial logit where the baseline 
category is the fixed regime. All regressions include year dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted X1. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significantly different from zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) and 99%( ***) 
confidence level.  
Table 2. The Financial View – Correlations
KAOpen Portfolio FinDev CumLoans FLM
KAOpen 1
Portfolio 0.4424† 1
FinDev 0.4136† 0.2591† 1
CumLoans 0.3436† 0.3462† 0.0741† 1
FLM 0.0397‡ 0.054† 0.0709† 0.5355† 1
Partial correlations between different measures of financial linkages.  Significantly different 
than zero at 95%(‡) and 99%( †) .
Table 3. The Financial View
EXPECTED SIGN FULL SAMPLE NON-IND. IND.
IMPOSSIBLE
TRINITY
CURRENCY 
MISMATCH
i ii iii iv v vi
KAOpen1 + - -0.047 -0.168*** -0.163*** -0.098** 0.824*** -0.272
(0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.199) (0.208)
Portfolio1 + - -15.498*** -10.959*** -9.022*** -12.013*** -18.758* -1.924
(3.022) (2.808) (2.334) (3.051) (11.007) (1.383)
FinDev1 + - -0.175 -1.373*** -0.152 -1.019***
(0.182) (0.197) (0.227) (0.259)
FLM1 - -0.719*** -0.032** -0.289** -0.042** -1.885*** 0.341
(0.156) (0.014) (0.144) (0.018) (0.564) (0.230)
Size1 + + 0.639*** 0.532*** 0.543*** 0.543*** 1.100*** 0.805***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.043) (0.042) (0.146) (0.164)
Obs. 2413 1945 468
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.125 0.442
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country is classified as a de facto flexible 
exchange rate regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed.  Estimations  from a multinomial logit where the baseline category 
is the fixed regime. All regressions include year dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted X1.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  Significantly different from zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) and 99%( ***) confidence level.   
Table 4. The Political View - Correlations
Herfindahl Years inOffice VetoPoints LegComp OperationsRisk CPIA
Herfindahl 1
Years inOffice 0.3025† 1
VetoPoints -0.511† -0.376† 1
LegComp -0.59† -0.187† 0.6663† 1
OperationsRisk -0.217† -0.105† 0.457† 0.3255† 1
CPIA -0.156† 0.079† 0.306† 0.2409† 0.4693† 1
Partial correlations between different political variables.  Significantly different than zero at 95%(‡) and 99%( †) . Herfindahl 
and Years in Office measure political strength, while VetoPoints and LegComp capture political weakness.
Table 5. The Political View
EXPECTED SIGN FULL SAMPLE NON-IND. IND.
POLICY
CRUTCH
SUSTAINA
BILITY
i ii iii iv v vi
CPIA1 + 0.513*** 0.121
(0.079) (0.081)
YearsinOffice + - -0.099*** -0.126*** -0.122*** -0.087*** -0.135 -0.364*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.104) (0.193)
YearsinOffice2 - + 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.016** 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.020)
VetoPoints1 - + 0.284*** 0.122*** 0.182*** 0.155*** 0.085 0.036
(0.024) (0.022) (0.034) (0.032) (0.197) (0.257)
Observations 3374 2168 599
Pseudo R2 0.0783 0.0931 0.0838
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country is classified as a de facto flexible exchange 
rate regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed.  Estimations  from a multinomial logit where the baseline category is the fixed 
regime. All regressions include year dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted X1.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  Significantly different from zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) and 99%( ***) confidence level.  CPIA captures 
institutional quality, YearsinOffice  political strength and VetoPoints political weakness.
Table 5b
ADOPTING A PEG†
EXPECTED SIGN LYS IMF
POLICY CRUTCH SUSTAINABILITY i ii
YearsinOffice - + 0.140*** -0.081**
(0.033) (0.031)
YearsinOffice2 + - -0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
VetoPoints1 + - -0.048 -0.193***
(0.038) (0.035)
High250 + - -0.225 0.684**
(0.465) (0.345)
Observations 1308 1132
Pseudo R2 0.0697 0.0932
The dependent variable is propensity to peg, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 
country is classified as a de facto fixed exchange rate regime.  All regressions include year 
dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted X1. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Significantly different than zero at the 90 %(*), 95 %(**) and 99 %( ***) 
confidence level. †The sample includes countries that are classified as non-pegs in the 
previous year.
Table 6. Baseline Specification
FULL SAMPLE NON-IND. IND.
Float Int Float Int Float Int
i ii iii iv v vi
Size1 0.647*** 0.517*** 0.601*** 0.681*** 0.998*** 0.999***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.072) (0.070) (0.228) (0.203)
Openness1 -1.924*** -1.155** -1.924*** -1.120** -19.964*** -4.210*
(0.532) (0.474) (0.623) (0.561) (4.379) (2.550)
TOTshocks 1.900 1.779 2.296 2.619 56.971*** 11.826
(1.481) (1.484) (1.925) (1.936) (17.705) (14.847)
KAOpen1 -0.111** -0.201*** -0.141** -0.011 0.770*** -0.363
(0.053) (0.053) (0.069) (0.066) (0.298) (0.235)
Portfolio1 -17.986*** -14.274*** -14.033*** -20.875*** -17.798 -2.265
(3.846) (4.659) (4.147) (5.767) (13.168) (1.683)
FinDev1 -0.880*** -1.900*** -0.251 -1.404***
(0.219) (0.241) (0.288) (0.336)
FLM1 -0.783*** -0.046 -0.411** -0.074** -0.913 0.547**
(0.175) (0.030) (0.194) (0.034) (0.744) (0.254)
CPIA 0.553*** -0.047
(0.129) (0.116)
YearsinOffice -0.067** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.111*** 0.155 -0.298
(0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.028) (0.219) (0.225)
YearsinOffice2 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.004 0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.018)
VetoPoints1 0.317*** 0.180*** 0.223*** 0.171*** 1.540*** 1.349***
(0.042) (0.036) (0.047) (0.041) (0.420) (0.388)
Observations 2028 1392 452
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.193 0.500
Joint test†
OCA 208.40*** 124.21*** 102.43*** 119.09*** 80.88*** 35.88***
Financial 112.46*** 129.61*** 24.93*** 49.19*** 7.41* 5.49
Political 121.18*** 97.74*** 78.28*** 69.54*** 27.25*** 14.47***
 The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country is classified as a de facto 
flexible exchange rate regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed.  Estimations  from a multinomial logit where the 
baseline category is the fixed regime. All regressions include year dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are 
denoted X1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significantly different from zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) 
and 99%( ***) confidence level.   †Reports the χ2 corresponding to the Wald test of the variables associated with 
each group of explanations.
Table 7. Alternative Regime Classifications
LYS RR
NON-IND. IND. NON-IND. IND.
Float Int Float Int Float Int Float Int
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii
Size1 0.571*** 0.546*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.571*** 0.638*** -0.940*** -0.456***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.228) (0.203) (0.084) (0.066) (0.310) (0.126)
Openness1 -1.343** -1.255** -19.964*** -4.210* -4.644*** -1.065* -44.421*** -9.553***
(0.526) (0.498) (4.379) (2.550) (1.102) (0.575) (7.397) (2.115)
TOTshocks 0.570 0.976 56.971*** 11.826 5.223** 3.498* 62.476** 20.026*
(1.523) (1.545) (17.705) (14.847) (2.392) (2.035) (26.022) (10.806)
KAOpen1 -0.157*** -0.089 0.770*** -0.363 -0.345*** -0.123** 1.639*** -0.153
(0.060) (0.058) (0.298) (0.235) (0.096) (0.058) (0.543) (0.172)
Portfolio1 -11.254*** -20.951*** -17.798 -2.265 -5.005 -8.821*** -14.162*** -5.439
(3.236) (5.005) (13.168) (1.683) (3.129) (3.359) (5.247) (4.305)
FinDev1 -0.180 -1.075*** -0.391 -0.995***
(0.269) (0.317) (0.383) (0.298)
FLM1 -0.315** -0.059* -0.913 0.547** -0.091 -0.283*** -3.322*** -0.175
(0.151) (0.031) (0.744) (0.254) (0.092) (0.095) (0.719) (0.221)
YearsinOffice -0.104*** -0.120*** 0.155 -0.298 -0.102*** 0.059** 0.327 0.351**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.219) (0.225) (0.039) (0.025) (0.285) (0.172)
YearsinOffice2 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.004 0.019 0.002 -0.002** -0.009 -0.033**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) (0.015)
VetoPoints1 0.287*** 0.194*** 1.540*** 1.349*** 0.264*** 0.390*** 13.539*** 0.865***
(0.044) (0.038) (0.420) (0.388) (0.057) (0.039) (0.985) (0.282)
Observations 1576 452 1448 452
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.500 0.216 0.491
Joint test†
OCA 102.43*** 119.09*** 80.88*** 35.88*** 93.82*** 108.39*** 41.93*** 28.58***
Financial 24.93*** 49.19*** 7.41* 5.49 22.77*** 42.22*** 22.92*** 4.37
Political 78.28*** 69.54*** 27.25*** 14.47*** 61.40*** 116.10*** 210.98*** 13.89***
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country is classified as a flexible exchange 
rate regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed.  LYS reflects the Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger  (2003, 2005) 
classification and RR reflects the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) one.  Estimations  from a multinomial logit where the 
baseline category is the fixed regime. All regressions include year dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted 
X1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significantly different from zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) and 99%( ***) 
confidence level.   †Reports the χ2 corresponding to the Wald test of the variables associated with each group of 
explanations.
Table 7b. The De Jure Classification
LYS IMF
NON-IND. IND. NON-IND. IND.
FLOAT INT FLOAT INT FLOAT INT FLOAT INT
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Size1 0.571*** 0.546*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.247*** 0.753*** 0.003 0.868***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.228) (0.203) (0.067) (0.060) (0.183) (0.165)
Openness1 -1.343** -1.255** -19.964*** -4.210* -3.599*** -1.457*** -18.544*** 7.170***
(0.526) (0.498) (4.379) (2.550) (0.660) (0.547) (3.735) (2.691)
TOTshocks 0.570 0.976 56.971*** 11.826 3.752 1.351 32.720* 48.050***
(1.523) (1.545) (17.705) (14.847) (2.436) (2.279) (16.936) (14.154)
KAOpen1 -0.157*** -0.089 0.770*** -0.363 -0.003 -0.029 1.600*** -0.294*
(0.060) (0.058) (0.298) (0.235) (0.068) (0.059) (0.279) (0.168)
Portfolio1 -11.254*** -20.951*** -17.798 -2.265 -7.117 -20.983*** -5.550 -2.264
(3.236) (5.005) (13.168) (1.683) (5.079) (4.973) (6.792) (1.943)
FinDev1 -0.180 -1.075*** 0.392 -1.298***
(0.269) (0.317) (0.302) (0.325)
FLM1 -0.315** -0.059* -0.913 0.547** -0.418** -0.707*** 0.305 -1.086***
(0.151) (0.031) (0.744) (0.254) (0.203) (0.208) (0.244) (0.254)
YearsinOffice -0.104*** -0.120*** 0.155 -0.298 0.013 0.019 0.307 -0.410*
(0.030) (0.027) (0.219) (0.225) (0.042) (0.030) (0.256) (0.231)
YearsinOffice2 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.004 0.019 -0.002 -0.002** -0.032 0.038*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.018) (0.002) (0.001) (0.024) (0.021)
VetoPoints1 0.287*** 0.194*** 1.540*** 1.349*** 0.188*** 0.246*** 0.770 -0.804**
(0.044) (0.038) (0.420) (0.388) (0.047) (0.040) (0.894) (0.324)
Observations 1576 1576 452 452 1536 1536 446 446
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.500 0.249 0.514
Joint test†
OCA 102.43*** 119.09*** 80.88*** 35.88*** 49.88*** 195.05*** 39.81*** 39.98***
Financial 24.93*** 49.19*** 7.41* 5.49 7.07* 31.08*** 33.23*** 30.43***
Political 78.28*** 69.54*** 27.25*** 14.47*** 47.29*** 92.65*** 2.56 8.60**
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country is classified as a flexible exchange rate 
regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed. LYS reflects the Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger  (2003, 2005) classification and 
IMF the de jure one. Estimations from a multinomial logit where the baseline category is the fixed regime. All 
regressions include year dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted X1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significantly different from zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) and 99%( ***) confidence level.  
†Reports the χ2 corresponding to the Wald test of the variables associated with each group of explanations
Table 8. Additional Robustness Checks
INITIAL VALUES FIXED EFFECTS IV†
Float Int Float Int Float Int
i ii iii iv v vi
Size1 0.506*** 0.427*** 0.664*** 0.537*** 0.743*** 0.616***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.069)
Openness1 -1.977*** -1.318* -0.482 0.505
(0.676) (0.679) (0.708) (0.718)
Opennessi -4.332*** -2.531***
(0.595) (0.521)
TOTShocks 2.724* 2.864* 1.983 1.806 3.598* 3.762*
(1.631) (1.624) (2.093) (2.091) (2.269) (2.388)
KaOpen1 -0.155*** -0.206*** -0.232*** -0.325*** -0.105** -0.178***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.069) (0.071) (0.063) (0.065)
Portfolio1 -17.579*** -16.377*** -21.302*** -23.996***
(3.142) (3.459) (4.803) (6.864)
Portfolio5 -20.155*** -11.257**
(5.085) (5.690)
FinDev1 -0.656*** -1.731*** -0.008 -0.929*** -0.827*** -1.757***
(0.215) (0.242) (0.267) (0.285) (0.233) (0.243)
FLM1 -0.867*** -0.178 -0.697*** -0.061***
(0.187) (0.154) (0.246) (0.027)
FLMi -0.413** -0.016
(0.168) (0.019)
YearsinOffice -0.049* -0.106*** -0.075** -0.113*** -0.064*** -0.118***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029)
YearsinOffice 2 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
VetoPoints 1 0.321*** 0.179*** 0.447*** 0.305*** 0.323*** 0.18***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.055) (0.052) (0.047) (0.04)
Observations 2185 2028
Pseudo R2 0.196
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country is classified as a 
flexible exchange rate regime, 2 if intermediate and 3 if fixed.  The estimations come from a 
multinomial logit where the baseline category is the  fixed regime. All regressions include year 
dummies.  Lagged values of variable X are denoted X1.  Initial values of variable X are denoted Xi. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  †IV: instruments for Portfolio1: Libor and per capita GDP in 
USD; instruments for FLM1: Rule of Law and lagged value of FLM1 (FLM2).   Significantly different 
than zero at the 90%(*), 95%(**) and 99%( ***) confidence level.
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APPENDIX 1
List of countries (183)
Industrials BAHRAIN EQUATORIAL GUINEA MALAWI SEYCHELLES 
AUSTRALIA BANGLADESH ESTONIA MALAYSIA SIERRA LEONE
AUSTRIA BARBADOS ETHIOPIA MALDIVES SINGAPORE 
BELGIUM BELARUS FIJI MALI SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
CANADA BELIZE GABON MALTA SLOVENIA 
DENMARK BENIN GAMBIA, THE MARSHALL ISLANDS SOLOMON ISLANDS 
FINLAND BHUTAN GEORGIA MAURITANIA SOMALIA 
FRANCE BOLIVIA GHANA MAURITIUS SOUTH AFRICA 
GERMANY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA GRENADA MEXICO SRI LANKA 
GREECE BOTSWANA GUATEMALA MICRONESIA, FED.STS. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
ICELAND BRAZIL GUINEA MOLDOVA ST. LUCIA 
IRELAND BRUNEI DARUSSALAM GUINEA-BISSAU MONGOLIA ST. VINCENT & GRENS.
ITALY BULGARIA GUYANA MOROCCO SUDAN 
JAPAN BURKINA FASO HAITI MOZAMBIQUE SURINAME 
LUXEMBOURG BURUNDI HONDURAS MYANMAR SWAZILAND 
NETHERLANDS CAMBODIA HUNGARY NAMIBIA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
NEW ZEALAND CAMEROON INDIA NEPAL TAJIKISTAN 
NORWAY CAPE VERDE INDONESIA NETHERLANDS ANTILLES TANZANIA 
PORTUGAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. IRAN, I.R. OF NICARAGUA THAILAND 
SAN MARINO COLOMBIA IRAQ NIGER TOGO 
SPAIN COMOROS ISRAEL NIGERIA TONGA 
SWEDEN CONGO, DEM. REP. OF JAMAICA OMAN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
SWITZERLAND CONGO, REPUBLIC OF JORDAN PAKISTAN TUNISIA 
UNITED KINGDOM COSTA RICA KAZAKHSTAN PALAU TURKEY 
UNITED STATES COTE D IVOIRE KENYA PANAMA TURKMENISTAN 
CROATIA KIRIBATI PAPUA NEW GUINEA UGANDA 
CYPRUS KOREA PARAGUAY UKRAINE 
Non-Industrials CZECH REPUBLIC KUWAIT PERU UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
AFGHANISTAN, I.S. OF CHAD KYRGYZ REPUBLIC PHILIPPINES URUGUAY
ALBANIA CHILE LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.REP POLAND VANUATU
ALGERIA CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND LATVIA QATAR VENEZUELA, REP. BOL.
ANGOLA CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG LEBANON ROMANIA VIETNAM 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA DJIBOUTI LESOTHO RUSSIA YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF
ARGENTINA DOMINICA LIBERIA RWANDA ZAMBIA 
ARMENIA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC LIBYA SAMOA ZIMBABWE 
ARUBA ECUADOR LITHUANIA SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
AZERBAIJAN EGYPT MACEDONIA, FYR SAUDI ARABIA 
BAHAMAS, THE EL SALVADOR MADAGASCAR SENEGAL
APPENDIX 2
Variables Definitions and Sources
Size Logarithm  of GDP in dollars.  (Source: World Economic Outlook-IMF).
Openness Ratio of [export + import]/2 to GDP (Source: IFS (line 90c+line 98c)/2/ line 99b).
TradeConc Geographical concentration of trade, the share of exports to the reference currency country multiplied 
by openness. (Source: Direction of Trade Statistics- IMF).
TOTShocks Standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of trade over the previous five years adjusted by average 
openness in the 5 previous years.  (Source: WDI Series Code: NY.EXP.CAPM.KN).
KAOpen Measure of capital openness provided by Chinn and Ito (2007), based in four binary dummy variables 
reported in the IMF´s Annual  Report  on Exchange  Rates  and Exchange Restrictions  with a higher 
number indicating capital account liberalization.
Portfolio Sum  of  the  absolute  value  of  inward  and  outward  flows  of  portfolio  investments  and  financial 
derivatives  as  a  ratio  of  GDP.  (Source:  IFS.(  |line  78bfd|+|line  78bgd|+|line  78bwd|+|line 
78bxd|) /GDP).
FinDev Dummy indicating that the country made it into the EMBI global Index or belongs to industrial group. 
CumLoans Sum  of  cumulative  flows  of  portfolio  debt  assets,  other  assets  and  net  errors  and  omissions. 
(Source:External Wealth of Nations Data Set).
FLM Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money.  (Source: IFS line 26C/ (line 14 + line 24).
Herfindahl The sum of  the squared seat  shares  of all  parties in the government.  (Source:  Database of  Political 
Institutions 2006, Thorsten et al. (2001)).
YearsinOffice Years the incumbent administration has been in office. (Source: Database of Political Institutions 2006, 
Thorsten et al. (2001)).
VetoPoints Variable referred to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities. (Polcon_2005 Database).
LegComp Legislative index of electoral competitiveness. (Source: World Bank´s Database of Political Institutions 
2006, Thorsten et al. (2001)).
OperationsRisk Survey  to  gauge  the  operations  climate  for  foreign  businesses,  a  higher  value  indicating  a  better 
environment. (Source: Business Environment Risk Intelligence S.A.).
CPIA World Bank´s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Rating System. This measure is composed of 
20 different components covering macroeconomic and sectoral policies, as well as issues such as the 
rule of law and corruption. Each of the twenty components is rated by country specialists, on a scale of 
1-6, using standardized criteria. 
Inflation Logarithm of one plus the annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index. (Source: IFS line 64)
High250 Dummy variable for High Inflation. (Inflation greater than 250% in the previous year).
Variable1 Lagged value of Variable
Variablei Initial value of Variable
Dependent 
Variables
Categorical Variable LYS  (Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and Federico Sturzenegger, 2005)  
Categorical Variable  RR   (Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff, 2004)  Categorical Variable IMF 
(Ghosh, Atish; Gulde, Anne-Marie and Wolf Holger, 2003 )
Summary statistics (baseline sample)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Size 2028 10.066 2.107 5.318 16.210
Openness 2028 0.349 0.185 0.000 1.337
TOTShocks 2028 0.051 0.052 0.002 0.878
KAOpen 2028 0.210 1.524 -1.810 2.530
Portfolio 2028 0.026 0.099 0.000 1.928
FinDev 2028 0.308 0.462 0 1
FLM 2028 0.816 4.270 -0.047 81.589
YearsinOffice 2028 6.979 7.525 1 46
VetoPoints 2028 4.716 2.352 1 7
CPIA 1392 3.225 0.746 0 5.075
